Opposition to the planned war on Iraq is mounting around the globe and even in the halls of Congress. Few, however, are willing to criticize the war in Afghanistan, seeing it as the one shining success of the war on terrorism. One year later (the bombing started Oct. 7, 2001), it’s a suitable time for a critical look at some of those “successes.”
The war increased the threat of terrorism. “Classified investigations of the al-Qaida threat now under way at the FBI and CIA have concluded the war in Afghanistan failed to diminish the threat to the United States,” according to the June 16 New York Times. “Instead, the war might have complicated counterterrorism efforts by dispersing potential attackers across a wider geographic area.” Middle-level operatives of the al-Qaida network used the opportunity to strengthen contacts with other Islamic groups in the region, increasing the pool from which future terrorists will be drawn. And the war didn’t result in the apprehension of Osama bin Laden.
Many innocents were killed. More than 7 million Afghans were directly dependent on aid, which was disrupted for September, October and part of November, first by the threat of bombing and then by the bombing. According to a survey by the London Guardian newspaper focusing on the effects of that disruption, “As many as 20,000 Afghans may have lost their lives as an indirect consequence of the U.S. intervention.” Civilian deaths directly from the bombing are variously estimated at an additional 1,000 to 8,000.
The United States installed a puppet regime, throwing democracy out the window. The loya jirga or grand council was peopled with delegates selected by the United States.
According to Omar Zakhilwal and Adeena Niazi, delegates to the loya jirga, “We delegates were denied anything more than a symbolic role in the selection process. A small group of Northern Alliance chieftains decided everything behind closed doors.”
Since former monarch Zahir Shah, the most popular candidate for interim president, was unsuitable for U.S. interests, “the entire loya jirga was postponed for almost two days while the former king was strong-armed into renouncing any meaningful role in the government,” they said.
At that point, most delegates, aware that the U.S.-backed warlords held the monopoly of military power and fearing for their lives, silently went along with the American hijacking of the process.
The U.S. government has shown little concern for the rights of women in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the expressed commitment to building infrastructure for women’s education and health care, both shamefully neglected under the Taliban, the Bush administration has been so niggardly as to block $134 million in Afghan humanitarian aid, citing domestic economic problems. Of that, $2.5 million was for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, earmarked to build women’s centers across Afghanistan.
The U.S. government has done little to alleviate the extreme humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, let alone rebuild the country. U.S. contributions through UNICEF for Afghanistan have been less than a third as much as Japan’s. In fact, today, as winter approaches, 6 million Afghans — a larger number than before Sept. 11, 2001 — are once again on the brink, dependent on humanitarian aid to get through the next months.
The Iraq war is likely to recapitulate all of these results, from an increased risk of terrorism to fake democracy to a humanitarian crisis (relief agencies fear that bombing will disrupt government food distribution in Iraq). We don’t need any more “successes” in the war on terrorism.